Thoughts on Russia Prompted in Part by a Book by Masha Gessen.
March
27, 2022
I just finished
reading the book The Future is History, How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia,
by Masha Gessen.[1] It
is a very impressive book about how Russia developed after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Gessen’s book prompted some of the comments I make here. Others
are only mine. Given the crisis the current Russian invasion of Ukraine has
created, I hope you will find my comments interesting and helpful.
Gessen contends
that after the Soviet Union began to fall apart in the late 1980s and was gone
late in 1991, the Russian people lost the only identity they had been permitted
to have through the seventy-four years of Soviet communism. They no longer knew
who they were or what Russia was. Gessen explains that development in part by making
a distinction between two types of freedom. There is ”freedom to” and “freedom
from.” Both types of freedom probably sound positive to those of us from the
West, but the Russian people experienced them differently. “Freedom from”
sounds to me at least like freedom from all of repression of the Soviet years,
but “freedom from” played differently in Russia. To the Russians, it was
freedom from the security and stability of life in the USSR. In that system
everyone at least knew what their place was in the tightly controlled,
hierarchical structure of rule by the Communist Party. Gessen says that after
Stalin’s death in 1953 the Party used infrequent bits of random terror to keep
everyone slightly off balance, slightly apprehensive. In that state of affairs,
the last thing most of the people wanted to do was upset the system that
ordered their lives and gave them meaning as citizens of a world power engaged
in the supposedly great socialist experiment of building communism. Gessen
cites research that shows that in the three decades (a few years less than that
when she wrote the book) since the end of the USSR, what the Russian people
have wanted most is a return to the stability of the Soviet system. They also
believe that only a strong leader can give them that stability. They have
developed a nostalgia for Josef Stalin. He became for them a great hero because
he had established a stable order and had defeated the Germans in the Great
Patriotic War (which we call World War II). They either don’t know or just
overlook the fact that he was one of the great monsters of human history.
Gessen says that
in the first years after 1991 it looked like Russia was developing at least in
the direction of a Western style liberal democracy. Gessen posits however that
liberal democracy never had a chance in Russia. She says it didn’t because the
people were more interested in stability and security than in Western style
democratic freedoms. I think she’s right about that, but I would add another
element to the dynamic that made it extremely unlikely that Russia would become
a bigger version of today’s Germany or France. That factor is Russian history
going back long before the Soviet communists arrived on the scene. There has
never been in Russia anything at all like the democratic systems of western
Europe and the United States in which the people actually elect their leaders
and the law protects their individual rights. After the revolution of 1905
there was something called the Duma that looked like a parliament, but the tsar
was free to veto or just disregard anything the Duma did. After Tsar Nicholas
II abdicated in March 1917, there was for a while the Provisional Government
that was made up mostly of people committed to western style democracy. They
were however utterly ineffective is doing anything that Russia really needed at
the time. Most of all, they didn’t get Russia out of World War I, where the
Russians were taking a licking from the Germans. The Bolshevik coup of November
1917, (October in the calendar Russia was using at the time) put an end to the
Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks won the civil war that followed. In 1922
they created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which became one of the
least democratic, most oppressive state systems the world has ever known.
Gessen argues
that President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has created a political system that
has in common with the Soviet Union that it has a patina of democracy
superimposed over a totalitarian regime.[2]
The system looks like a democracy. Putin’s regime is not as repressive as the
Soviets had been. There are elections for the president and a few other
positions. Yet on the inside the system functions in much the same way that the
Soviet system did. The state has concentrated essentially all political power
in the office of the president. It has concentrated economic power in a few
people who are loyal to it. Owners of large businesses who criticize the
government are likely to have the state take their businesses away from them
and give them to people more loyal to Putin. Those former owners may also face
imprisonment on false charges (usually of financial wrongdoing), expulsion from
the country, or even murder. Political and economic power in Putin’s Russia are
highly centralized and controlled by the government.
Gessen says that
the post-Soviet regime in Russia uses warfare as a way of looking like the
strong state the people want. Her examples are Russia’s war in the former
Soviet republic of Georgia in 2008 and the Russian takeover of Crimea from
Ukraine in 2014. She also mentions the secessionist movements in the eastern
part of Ukraine called the Donbas, movements Russia has supported with military
aid. She wrote this book several years before Russia’s current invasion of
Ukraine, so she doesn’t mention it. It does however fit the pattern she
describes perfectly.
In each of the
instances of war Gessen mentions, and in the current invasion of Ukraine, Putin
has copied the example of Adolf Hitler. In 1938, after getting Great Britain
and France to let him do it, Hitler invaded and occupied the border regions of
Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland after the Sudeten mountains. The
population of the Sudetenland was predominantly German. Hitler claimed that he did
it to defend the Germans of the region who, he said, the Czechs were
oppressing. He said those Germans should never have been included in
Czechoslovakia when that country was created after World War I but should
always have been part of the German homeland.
Putin says
exactly the same thing about people who are linguistically and culturally
Russian but who live in former Soviet republics other than Russia. There are
significant numbers of such people in all of the former Soviet republics, but
this demographic circumstance is particularly apparent in Ukraine. There are
areas within the independent nation of Ukraine where the population is majority
Russian not Ukrainian. These areas include Crimea, the Donbas, and the city the
Ukrainians call Kharkiv, and the Russians call Kharkov, located in northeast
Ukraine near the Russian border. There are many Russians elsewhere in Ukraine
too. There are also many Ukrainians living in Russia, but they don’t seem to be
an issue for Putin.
Putin presents
himself as the protector of the Russians in Ukraine against Ukrainian
oppression. He has even accused the Ukrainians of genocide against those
Russians, never mind that there isn’t a shred of evidence that the Ukrainians
have ever done any such thing. He says the majority Russian parts of Ukraine
should never have been in Ukraine in the first place. Ukraine’s current border with
Russia is the border of the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic when the
Soviet Union dissolved. Except in the far west of Ukraine where the border between
the USSR and the nations of eastern Europe was changed after World War II, most
of the border between Russia and Ukraine was set by communist bureaucrats in
Moscow back in the 1920s. Putin says Russia accepted that border when the USSR
broke up only because Russia was so weak at the time that it could not accomplish
any revision of the border. He speaks of Russia having “lost” the Russians of
Ukraine and elsewhere when the Soviet Union dissolved and each of the fifteen constituent
republics of the country became independent states.
There is another
aspect of Putin’s understanding of Ukraine that Gessen mentions briefly. There
are today three nations in which the majority population is east Slavic. They
are Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Linguists say there are three east Slavic
languages—Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian. In the days of the Russian Empire
the Russians considered Ukrainian and Belorussian to be only dialects of
Russian not separate languages. No reputable linguist today agrees with that
assertion. Putin does. He says that the three east Slavic peoples are actually
only one people, some of whom speak a rather difficult to understand dialect of
Russian. I am sure virtually no Ukrainian or Belorussian person agrees with
him. Yet Putin makes that assertion in support of his desire to unite all east
Slavic people in one restored Russian empire. The leader of Belorussia today is
a close ally of Putin’s, so we hear of no trouble between those two nations. Most
Ukrainians, however, want their country to align itself with NATO and the
European Union not with Russia. It may well be that Putin thought that by
invading Ukraine he could oust the current government and put in one that would
bring Ukraine into Russia’s orbit. If so, so far that effort has failed.
There are many
other interesting parts of Gessen’s book. Here’s one of them. I knew that
several years ago the Russian government enacted a law that prohibits what it
calls “homosexual propaganda.” No one in Russia may advocate gay rights or do
much of anything in defense of LGBTQ+ people without violating that law. I didn’t
know just how that law came about. As Gessen tells it, anti-gay propagandists,
the Russian Orthodox Church, and Putin’s government made a direct connection
between homosexuality and pedophilia. We know that there is not such
connection. Most of the men who sexually molest boys are straight. Still, anti-gay
bigots in Russia whipped the Russian people into an anti-gay frenzy. Innocent
men were accused of sexually abusing boys. The advocates of the law shouted, “We
must protect the children!” Predictably, violence against men who were gay or
who someone only thought were gay increased. LGBTQ+ people in Russia have been
driven back into the closet where they had been under the Soviets. As Gessen
tells it, the cultural conditions which produced that terrible law have made
life for sexual minorities in Russia extremely difficult.
Putin’s regime’s
assault on gays is actually part of a larger aspect of Putin’s agenda. He is
trying to recreate the Soviet Union, or perhaps more accurately the Russian
Empire, as closely as he can. He wants Russia again to have the dominance it
once had over all of the former Soviet/Russian empire. He knows of course that
there was a sharp ideological divide between the USSR and the West during the Cold
War. The Soviet Union represented totalitarian communism. The West, including
primarily the United States, represented free market economics and political
democracy which protected individual rights. Now Putin, as far as he’s
concerned, has created a divide between western social liberalism and Russian
social conservatism. He sounds much like our American evangelical bigots. He
says Western liberal values are destroying the family, and he claims to be the guardian
of traditional family values. He sees Russia as the protector of what he
considers to be collective social wellbeing whereas the West puts too much
emphasis on the individual. He claims to be defending traditional Christian
values against Western secularism.
In this regard he
has an ally in the Russian Orthodox Church. There is much that is wonderful
about Orthodox Christianity. Its liturgy is powerful even if you don’t
understand the words the priests are saying. The Orthodox churches’ position on
social issues is definitely not one of the wonderful things about them. Those
churches, of which the Russian Orthodox Church is by far the largest, are and
always has been radically conservative in their views on social and moral
issues. The Orthodox churches also have a long tradition of supporting the
government and the ruling elites of the countries of which they are a part
regardless of what those governments and elites actually stand for. That
tradition goes all the way back to the fourth century CE when Christianity
became the established religion of the Roman Empire. The patriarch of Moscow
openly campaigns for Putin in Russia’s rigged presidential elections. The Russian
Orthodox Church enthusiastically supports Putin’s social bigotry and is in no
way a moral counterweight to it.
Does Putin really
believe the things he says about LGBTQ+ people being a threat to the family?
Does he really think male homosexuality and pedophilia go together? There’s no
way to know, but it really doesn’t matter. What matters is the way he uses
social conservatism to whip up political support for himself and his political
allies. He uses it to give Russia a new identity to replace the old communist
one Russia lost when the Soviet Union folded. He uses it to generate support
for him and his policies by making a distinction between Russia and West much
as one existed in what he considers to have been the good old days of the USSR.
Putin’s ideology
and personality cause him to take some positions that are fanciful but
dangerous. He tells the Russian people that the United States is working to
extend its political and economic domination over all the earth. He may be
right about that, but he also says that the United States instigates and
finances things like the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of late 2004 and early
2005 that drove a pro-Russian (and horribly corrupt) president of Ukraine out
of the country. He seems to believe, or at least he says he believes, that the
US is out to bring about regime change in Russia. President Biden’s recent
statement that Putin cannot remain in power plays directly into this narrative
of Putin’s. It gives him strong evidence to support his claim and to generate
support among the Russian people.
As the subtitle
of her book states, Gessen believes that Russia is once again a totalitarian
state of the kind it was under the Soviet communists. Putin’s government doesn’t
look like the totalitarian state of the Soviet Union controlled by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the outside, but under a cover of
democracy it operates in essentially the same way. Putin has condemned the
communist ideology of the USSR, but he wants to recreate the USSR in every
other respect. His passion to reestablish Russian dominance over what was the
USSR makes him a continuing threat to peace in that part of the world. He will
remain a threat regardless of how his invasion of Ukraine works out. I hope and
pray that he will not do in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, each of them like
Ukraine a former Soviet Socialist Republic, what he has done in Ukraine. Unlike
Ukraine, each of them is a member of NATO. Each is covered by Article 5 of the
NATO treaty, which says that an attack on any NATO member is an attack on all
NATO members. The last thing in the world NATO needs is a war with Russia, one
of the world’s major nuclear powers. I hope that Putin realizes that the last
thing Russia needs is a war with NATO.
[1] Gessen,
Masha, The Future is History, How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia,
(Riverhead Books, New York, 2017).
[2]
The various constitutions of the USSR over the course of its existence did
things like establish free elections and guarantee rights of freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, etc. Those constitutions were merely window dressing. No
Soviet citizen was allowed to raise the guarantee of rights in the constitution
as a defense when charged with having said or written the wrong thing.